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Abstract
A stochastic model with a continuum of economic agents often involves shocks at both
macro and micro levels. This can be formalized by a continuum of random variables that
are conditionally independent given the macro level shocks. Based on the framework of a
Fubini extension, the results on the exact law of large numbers and its converse for a con-
tinuum of independent random variables in [14] are extended to the setting with conditional
independence given general macro states. As an illustrative application, it is shown that
any ex ante efficient allocation in an asymmetric information economy with general aggre-
gate uncertainty has a (utility) equivalent allocation that is incentive compatible, which
generalizes the corresponding results in [15] to the case with infinitely many states.
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1 Introduction
As noted in [7], macroeconomic risks are the common random shocks that influence a significant
portion of the population while reality suggests that these are supplemented by risks at the
individual level that influence a negligible portion of the population. This can be formalized by
a process with a continuum of conditionally independent random variables, given the macro level
shocks. However, it is shown in Proposition 4 of [7] that a standard joint measurability condition
on the process of a continuum of random variables will imply the non-existence of individual
level uncertainty. To resolve the non-compatibility of joint measurability with individual level
uncertainty in our setting, we adopt the framework of a Fubini extension,1 as used in [14] for
studying a continuum of independent random variables.
It is shown in Theorem 2.8 of [14] that a process measurable in a Fubini extension is
essentially pairwise independent if and only if it satisfies the property of coalitional aggregate
certainty in the sense that the sample distributions, based on any non-negligible collection of
random variables, are essentially constant.2 It means that the exact law of large numbers and
its converse hold in the framework of a Fubini extension. When there are only finitely many
macro states, it is clear that such results are still valid in the conditional setting; see Corollary
2.11 in [14]. A main purpose of this paper is to show the validity of the conditional exact law of
large numbers and its converse for the case with infinitely many macro states. In particular, we
show in Theorem 1 that if a process f has essentially pairwise independent random variables
conditioned on a countably generated σ-algebra C of events in the sample space,3 then the
sample distribution essentially equals the average regular conditional distribution of the random
variables given C. Furthermore, Theorem 2 shows the converse version of the (coalitional)
conditional exact law of large numbers.
The next question is how strong the independence assumption conditioned on a count-
ably generated σ-algebra is. For any process f measurable in a Fubini extension, it is obvious
that it has event-wise measurable conditional probabilities.4 Then Theorem 1 of [7] shows the
existence of a countably generated σ-algebra C such that the process f has essentially pairwise
conditionally independent random variables given C. Hence, as noted formally in Lemma 2
below, our assumption of conditional independence in Theorem 1 is satisfied in general. Fur-
thermore, basic intuition suggests that the macro shocks should reflect the uncertainty at the
1A Fubini extension is an extension of the usual product probability space that retains the Fubini property
for iterated integrals. For a formal definition, see Definition 2.2 in [14] and Definition 1 below.
2Theorem 7.6 of [13] contains the same result stated for a special type of Fubini extensions – the Loeb product
spaces.
3As noted in [2, Example 20.1, p. 270], a countably generated σ-algebra can be generated by a random
variable taken values in [0, 1].
4For the definition of event-wise measurable conditional probabilities, see Definition 4 of [7].
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collective level in some appropriate sense. Theorem 3 below provides some justification to this
intuition by showing that the macro states can be identified with aggregate uncertainty via
coalitions. In particular, the σ-algebra being conditioned on can be taken as the σ-algebra
generated by the sample distributions over all the coalitions. Theorem 2 of [5] shows the equiv-
alence of essential pairwise exchangeability and essential i.i.d. conditioned on some countably
generated σ-algebra. Under the framework of a Fubini extension, we show in Proposition 3 the
equivalence of essential pairwise exchangeability and essential i.i.d. conditioned on the sample
distributions.
It is well-known that there is a conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency
in a finite-agent asymmetric information economy (see, for example, [4] p. vi, Example 0.1]).
One would expect that such a conflict could be resolved in a large economy where individual
agents have no monopoly power on information. This intuition has been formalized in the
literature; see, for example, [9], [10] and [11] for a large but finite economy, [15] and [16] for an
economy with a continuum of agents. In particular, [15] considers an asymmetric information
economy, where the agents have negligible information in the sense that the private signals
of almost every individual can influence only a negligible group of agents and the individual
agents’ relevant signals are essentially pairwise independent conditioned on finitely many macro
states. It is shown in [15] that any ex ante efficient allocation in such an economy has a (utility)
equivalent allocation that is incentive compatible. As noted in the above paragraph, conditional
independence with possibly infinitely many macro states is generally satisfied. Thus, it is natural
to ask whether the result on the consistency of incentive compatibility and ex ante efficiency in
[15] still holds when there are infinitely many macro states. By applying the conditional exact
law of large numbers in our Theorem 1, the desired consistency result is shown in Theorem 4
below.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conditional exact law
of large numbers and its converse, and various related results. Section 3 considers the in-
centive compatibility problem in an asymmetric information economy with general aggregate
uncertainty. All the proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 Conditional Exact Law of Large Numbers and its Converse
2.1 Basic Definitions
Let (I,I, λ) be a complete atomless probability space5, which will be the index space for the
random variables in a process. Let (Ω,F , P ) be the sample probability space of the random
variables in a process. In applications, the index space often represents the space of economic
5We use the convention that all probability spaces are countably additive and complete.
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agents while the sample space models all the uncertainty associated with the agents. As noted
in the introduction, we will use a process with a continuum of conditionally independent random
variables to model both macroeconomic risks and individual level uncertainty. To resolve the
non-compatibility of joint measurability with individual level uncertainty,6 the framework of a
Fubini extension will be used as introduced in [14]. Below is a formal definition of a Fubini
extension as in Definition 2.2 in [14].
Definition 1. A probability space (I ×Ω,W, Q) extending the usual product space (I ×Ω,I ⊗
F , λ⊗ P ) is said to be a Fubini extension of the usual product (I ×Ω,I ⊗ F , λ⊗ P ) if for any
real-valued Q-integrable function f on (I × Ω,W),
(1) the two functions fi and fω are integrable, respectively, on (Ω,F , P ) for λ-almost all i ∈ I,
and on (I,I, λ) for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω;7
(2)
∫
Ω fidP and
∫
I
fωdλ are integrable, respectively, on (I,I, λ) and (Ω,F , P ), with
∫
I×Ω fdQ =∫
I
(
∫
Ω fidP )dλ =
∫
Ω(
∫
I
fωdλ)dP .
To reflect the fact that the probability space (I × Ω,W, Q) has (I,I, λ) and (Ω,F , P ) as its
marginal spaces, as required by the Fubini property, it will be denoted by (I ×Ω,I ⊠F , λ⊠ P ).
Below we provide a formal definition of a process with conditionally uncorrelated/independent
random variables based on a Fubini extension.
Definition 2. Let (I ×Ω,I ⊠F , λ⊠P ) be a Fubini extension, C be a countably generated sub-
σ-algebra of F ,8 and X a complete separable metrizable topological space (i.e. a Polish space)
with the Borel σ-algebra B. Let M(X) be the space of Borel probability measures on X.
(1) Two real-valued square integrable random variables φ and ψ from (Ω,F , P ) to R are said
to be conditionally uncorrelated given C if, the conditional expectations satisfy
E(φψ|C) = E(φ|C)E(ψ|C). (1)
(2) A real-valued square integrable process f on (I ×Ω,I ⊠F , λ⊠P ) is said to be essentially
conditionally uncorrelated given C if, for λ-almost all i1 ∈ I, the random variable fi1 is
conditionally uncorrelated with fi2 given C for λ-almost all i2 ∈ I.
6Proposition 4 of [7] shows that a standard joint measurability condition on the process of a continuum of
random variables will imply the non-existence of individual level uncertainty.
7In the sequel, we shall often use subscripts to denote some variable of a function that is viewed as a parameter
in a particular context.
8Whenever necessary, we assume that a sub-σ-algebra of F is always strongly complete in the sense that it
contains all the P -null sets in F .
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(3) Two random variables φ and ψ from (Ω,F , P ) to X are said to be conditionally indepen-
dent given C if, for any Borel sets B1, B2 ∈ B, the conditional probabilities satisfy
P (φ−1(B1) ∩ ψ−1(B2)|C) = P (φ−1(B1)|C)P (ψ−1(B2)|C). (2)
(4) A process f from (I×Ω,I⊠F , λ⊠P ) to X is said to be essentially pairwise conditionally
independent given C if, for λ-almost all i1 ∈ I, the random variables fi1 and fi2 are
conditionally independent given C for λ-almost all i2 ∈ I.9
The following remark indicates the existence of non-trivial processes in a Fubini extension
that have essentially pairwise independent random variables conditioned on any fixed countably
generated σ-algebra of events.
Remark 1. The existence of non-trivial, independent and measurable processes in a rich Fu-
bini extension is shown in [13, Theorem 6.2] for general atomless Loeb product spaces. [14,
Proposition 5.6] provides another construction of a rich Fubini extension with the unit interval
[0, 1] as the agent space and an extended continuum product probability space as the sample
space. The main results of [17] and [12] show respectively that the agent space can be taken as
an extended Lebesgue unit interval or a general saturated probability space. Let g be a process
from a Fubini extension (I ×Ω,I ⊠F , λ⊠P ) to R such that the random variables gi, i ∈ I are
essentially pairwise independent. Let C be a countably generated sub-σ-algebra of F ; assume
that it is generated by a real valued random variable θ on (Ω,F , P ). As in Remark 1 of [7], let
f be the process from I × Ω to R2 such that f(i, ω) = (θ(ω), g(i, ω)) for each (i, ω) ∈ I × Ω.
Then f is measurable in the Fubini extension (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P ). By Proposition 3 in [6],
the random variables gi(·), i ∈ I are also essentially pairwise conditionally independent given
C; so too are the random variables fi(·), i ∈ I.
2.2 An Antecedent Result
The following exact law of large numbers is Proposition 2.5 in [14].10 It shows that the sample
means of a real-valued square integrable process with essentially uncorrelated random variables
in a Fubini extension are essentially constant.
Proposition 1. Let f be a real-valued square integrable process on a Fubini extension (I×Ω,I⊠
F , λ⊠P ). If the random variables fi are essentially uncorrelated, then for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω,
then the sample mean Efω =
∫
I
fωdλ is the same as the mean of the process Ef =
∫
I×Ω fdλ⊠P .
9Theorem 1 of [6] shows that essential pairwise conditional independence is equivalent to its finite or infinite
multivariate versions.
10Theorem 3.8 of [13] contains the same result stated for the Loeb product spaces.
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Let f ′ be a real-valued square integrable process on (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P ) such that the
random variables f ′i are essentially orthogonal with common mean zero. Then, it is obvious
from the above exact law of large numbers that
∫
I
f ′ω(i)dλ = 0 for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω.
Now let f be a real-valued square integrable process on (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ⊠ P ) such that
the random variables fi are essentially conditionally uncorrelated given a countably generated
sub-σ-algebra C of F . Let g be the conditional expectation E(f |I ⊗ C). It is easy to show that
for λ-almost all i ∈ I, gi = E(fi|C) (see Lemma 3 in the Appendix). Define a process f ′ on
(I ×Ω,I ⊠F , λ⊠P ) by letting f ′ = f − g. It is easy to check that the random variables f ′i are
essentially orthogonal with common mean zero. The following is thus an obvious corollary of
Proposition 1.
Corollary 1. Let f be a real-valued square integrable process on (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P ). If f
is essentially conditionally uncorrelated given a countably generated sub-σ-algebra C of F , then
for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, ∫
I
fω(i)dλ =
∫
I
E(f |I ⊗ C)dλ.
2.3 Conditional Exact Law of Large Numbers
Theorem 5.2 of [13] and Theorem 2.8 of [14] present an exact law of large numbers in terms of
sample distributions. It shows that essential pairwise independence is sufficient for the sample
distributions to be essentially constant. Let C be a countably generated sub-σ-algebra of F .
We shall work with essentially pairwise independent processes conditioned on C. As noted in
Corollary 2.11 in [14], if C is generated by a finite (or countable) partition of Ω, the exact law
of large numbers in terms of sample distributions still holds, conditioned on each event in the
partition. However, if C is not generated by a countable partition, then we can not derive the
conditional exact law of large numbers by Theorem 2.8 of [14] directly. The purpose of this
subsection is to present the conditional exact law of large numbers in the general setting.
Recall that we use a process f with conditionally independent random variables given
C to model both macroeconomic risks and individual level uncertainty, where C represents the
macro states. In the following definition, we introduce a terminology to describe the cancelation
of individual uncertainty via aggregation.
Definition 3. Let f be a process from (I ×Ω,I ⊠F , λ⊠P ) to a Polish space X, C a countably
generated sub-σ-algebra of F , and µ a regular conditional distribution of f given I ⊗ C. The
process f is said to have no individual uncertainty in aggregation given C if λf−1ω =
∫
I
µiωdλ
holds for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, where ∫
I
µiωdλ is the random Borel probability measure ρ on X
defined by ρ(B) =
∫
I
µiω(B)dλ for any Borel set B in X.
Let f , C and µ be the same as in the above definition. The following lemma shows
that µ provides the regular conditional distributions of the individual random variables in a
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measurable way.
Lemma 1. Let f be a process from (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P ) to a Polish space X, C a countably
generated sub-σ-algebra of F , and µ a regular conditional distribution of f given I ⊗ C. Then,
for λ-almost all i ∈ I, µi is a regular conditional distribution of fi given C.
We are now ready to state formally a general version of the conditional exact law of large
numbers in terms of sample distributions.
Theorem 1. Let f be a process from (I×Ω,I⊠F , λ⊠P ) to a Polish space X. If f is essentially
pairwise conditionally independent given C, then f has no individual uncertainty in aggregation
given C.
If a real-valued process f is essentially pairwise conditionally independent given C, then
we can weaken the square integrability assumption on f in Corollary 1 to an integrability
assumption on f , which generalizes Corollary 2.10 of [14] to the conditional setting.
Corollary 2. Let f be a real-valued integrable process on (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P ). If f is
essentially pairwise conditionally independent given C, then for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, ∫
I
fω(i)dλ =∫
I
E(f |I ⊗ C)dλ.
2.4 Converse Conditional Exact Law of Large Numbers
It is easy to see that for a real-valued square integrable process f on a Fubini extension, the
property of essentially constant sample means can not guarantee the essential uncorrelatedness
for the random variables. However, part of Theorem 2.6 in [14] (and part of Theorem 4.6 in
[13]) presents a converse version of exact law of large numbers in the sense that f must be
essentially uncorrelated if the coalitional sample means are essentially constant. The following
proposition is an analog of that result in the conditional setting.
Proposition 2. Let f be a real-valued square integrable process on (I×Ω,I⊠F , λ⊠P ). If for
any A ∈ I, ∫
A
fω(t)dλ(t) =
∫
A
E(f |I ⊗ C)dλ holds for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, then f is essentially
conditionally uncorrelated given C.
Similarly, Theorem 2.8 in [14] (and part of Theorem 7.6 of [13]) obtains the converse
exact law of large numbers in terms of sample distributions in the sense that a process on a
Fubini extension must be essentially pairwise independent if the coalitional sample distributions
are essentially constant. To present the converse version of the conditional exact law of large
numbers in Theorem 1, we need the following definition first.
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Definition 4. Let f be a process from (I ×Ω,I ⊠F , λ⊠P ) to a Polish space X, C a countably
generated sub-σ-algebra of F , and µ a regular conditional distribution of f given I ⊗ C. The
process f is said to have no coalitional individual uncertainty in aggregation given C if for any
A ∈ I, and for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, λ((fAω )−1(B)) =
∫
A
µiω(B)dλ holds for any Borel set B in
X, where fA is the restriction of f on A× Ω.
Next we state a converse version of the conditional exact law of large numbers in terms
of sample distributions.
Theorem 2. Let f be a process from (I×Ω,I⊠F , λ⊠P ) to a Polish space X. If f has no coali-
tional individual uncertainty in aggregation given C, then f is essentially pairwise conditionally
independent given C.
2.5 Coalitional Aggregate Uncertainty
As indicated in the statements of Theorems 1 and 2, the assumption of conditional independence
given a countably generated σ-algebra plays a key role for the validity of the conditional exact
law of large numbers. An immediate question is how restrictive when such an assumption is
imposed on a general process from a Fubini extension to a Polish space. To answer this question,
we need to use Theorem 1 of [7] which provides a general characterization for a process (not
necessarily measurable in a Fubini extension) to have such a structure involving conditional
independence.11
Let f be a process from (I×Ω,I⊠F , λ⊠P ) to a Polish space X, F an event in F , and B
a Borel set in B. Then, the set f−1(B) is I⊠F-measurable, so is the set D = f−1(B)∩(I × F ).
The Fubini property implies that for λ-almost all i ∈ I, the section Di is F-measurable, and
the function P (Di) = P (F ∩ f−1i (B)) is I-measurable. This latter property is called event-wise
measurable conditional probabilities in Definition 4 in [7]. The following lemma is an immediate
consequence of Theorem 1 of [7], which means that our assumption of conditional independence
in Theorem 1 is satisfied in general.
Lemma 2. Let f be a process from (I ×Ω,I ⊠F , λ⊠P ) to a Polish space X. Then, there is a
countably generated σ-algebra C such that for λ-almost all i1 ∈ I, fi1 and fi2 are conditionally
independent given C for λ-almost all i2 ∈ I.
Let f be a process from (I ×Ω,I ⊠F , λ⊠ P ) to a Polish space X, which has essentially
pairwise conditionally independent random variables given a countably generated σ-algebra
C. When f is used to model both macroeconomic risks and individual level uncertainty, the
individual uncertainty is reflected by the random variables fi for individual agents i ∈ I while C
11Theorem 1 of [7] also indicates that the macro states could be identified via Monte Carlo simulations.
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represents (the information reflected by) the macro states. One can also consider the uncertainty
through aggregation at the coalitional level. Let Cf be the σ-algebra generated by the sample
distributions on all the coalitions plus the P -null sets. That is, Cf is generated by the F-
measurable mappings
({λ(fAω )−1(B) : A ∈ I, B ∈ B}) together with the P -null sets. Thus, Cf
reflects all the uncertainty at the aggregate level. By applying Theorem 1 to any given coalition
A with λ(A) > 0, it is clear that λ(fAω )
−1(B) is C-measurable for any B ∈ B, and hence Cf
is always a sub-σ-algebra of C. The following theorem shows that the macro states can be
identified with such coalitional aggregate uncertainty. It also implies that Cf is the smallest
sub-σ-algebra of F such that f has the conditional independence structure based on such a
sub-σ-algebra of F .
Theorem 3. Let f be a process from (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P ) to a Polish space X. Then the
σ-algebra Cf for the coalitional aggregate uncertainty has the following properties.
(1) The σ-algebra Cf is countably generated.
(2) The process f has no coalitional individual uncertainty in aggregation given Cf .
(3) The process f has essentially pairwise conditionally independent random variables given
Cf .
2.6 Exchangeability
Theorem 3 above shows that the macro states can be identified with the coalitional aggregate
uncertainty. We shall show that for the special case of an essentially pairwise exchangeable
process, the macro states can be identified with the aggregate uncertainty associated only with
the grand coalition I. We first recall some basic definitions as in [5] and [7].
Definition 5. Let f be a process from (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ⊠ P ) to a Polish space X.
(1) The process f is said to be essentially pairwise exchangeable if there exists a Borel prob-
ability measure pi on (X ×X,B ⊗ B) such that for λ-almost all i1 ∈ I, one has
P (f−1i1 (B1) ∩ f−1i2 (B2)) = pi(B1 ×B2) = pi(B2 ×B1)
for λ-almost all i2 ∈ I, and for all B1, B2 ∈ B.
(2) Let C be a countably generated sub-σ-algebra of F , and let µ be a C-measurable mapping
from Ω to M(X). The process f is said to be essentially i.i.d. conditioned on C if f is
essentially conditionally independent given C, and for λ-almost all i ∈ I, the C-measurable
mapping ω 7→ µω is a regular conditional distribution P (f−1i |C) of the random variable fi.
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Theorem 2 of [5] and Proposition 7 of [7] shows the equivalence of essential pairwise
exchangeability and essential i.i.d. conditioned on some countably generated σ-algebra. Under
the framework of a Fubini extension,the following proposition shows the equivalence of essential
pairwise exchangeability and essential i.i.d. conditioned on the sample distributions.
Proposition 3. Let f be a process from (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P ) to a Polish space X. Then
f is essentially pairwise exchangeable if and only if f is essentially i.i.d. conditioned on the
σ-algebra generated by the mapping λf−1ω from Ω to M(X).
3 Ex ante efficiency and incentive compatibility
3.1 The information structure
We follow the information structure as used in [15] and [16] except that we use a general state
space S here instead of a finite state space S in [15] and [16]. Fix an atomless probability space
(I,I, λ) representing the space of economic agents. Let T 0 = {q1, q2, . . . , qL} be the space of
all the possible signals (types) for individual agents, and ∆0 the space of probability measures
on T 0. Let (T,T , P T ) be a probability space that models the uncertainty associated with the
private signal profiles for all the agents. In particular, T is a space of functions from I to T 0.12
Thus, t ∈ T , as a function from I to T 0, represents a private signal profile for all agents in I.
For agent i ∈ I, t(i) (also denoted by ti) is the private signal of agent i while t−i the restriction
of the signal profile t to the set I \ {i} of agents different from i; let T−i be the set of all such
t−i. For simplicity, we shall assume that (T,T ) has a product structure so that T is a product
of T−i and T
0, while T is the product algebra of the power set T 0 on T 0 with a σ-algebra T−i
on T−i. For t ∈ T and t′i ∈ T 0, we shall adopt the usual notation (t−i, t′i) to denote the signal
profile whose value is t′i for agent i, and the same as t for other agents.
Let S be a complete separable metric space of true (or macro) states of nature (with its
Borel σ-algebra denoted by S), which influence the utilities of all the agents, but are not known
to the agents. Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space representing all the uncertainty on the true
states as well as on the signals for all the agents, where (Ω,F) is the product measurable space
(S × T,S ⊗ T ). Let PS and P T be the marginal probability measures of P respectively on
(S,S) and on (T,T ). Let s˜ and t˜i, i ∈ I be the respective projection mappings from Ω to S
and from Ω to T 0 with t˜i(s, t) = ti.
13 Denote by C the sub-σ-algebra of F generated by s˜ and
the P -null sets. Let (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ⊠ P ) be a Fubini extension.
12In the literature, one usually assumes that different agents have possibly different sets of signals and require
that the agents take all their own signals with positive probability. For notational simplicity, we choose to work
with a common set T 0 of signals, but allow zero probability for some of the redundant signals. There is no loss
of generality in this latter approach.
13 t˜i can also be viewed as a projection from T to T
0.
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For i ∈ I, let τi be the signal distribution of agent i on the space T 0,14 and PS×T−i(·|ti)
the conditional probability measure on the product measurable space (S × T−i,S ⊗ T−i) when
the signal of agent i is ti ∈ T 0. If τi({ti}) > 0, then it is clear that for D ∈ S ⊗ T−i,
PS×T−i(D|ti) = P (D × {ti})/τi({ti}).
Let f be the private signal process from (I×Ω,I⊠F , λ⊠P ) to T 0 such that f(i, ω) = t˜i(ω),
fω is I-measurable for each ω ∈ Ω, and f is essentially pairwise conditionally independent given
C.15
Let µ be a regular conditional distribution of f , given I ⊗ C. As noted in Lemma 1, for
λ-almost all i ∈ I, µi is a regular conditional distribution of fi given C. Let µ¯ be the agents’
average conditional signal distribution
∫
I
µidλ(i). Then, the Fubini property implies that µ¯ is
a C-measurable mapping from Ω to ∆0. We shall impose the non-triviality assumption on the
process f in the sense that the sub-σ-algebra of F generated by µ¯ and the P -null sets is the
same as C. It means that the agents’ average conditional signal distribution carries as much
information as the true states.
3.2 The large private information economy
We consider a large asymmetric information economy with its information structure as described
in Subsection 3.1. In this economy, agents i ∈ I are informed with their private signals ti ∈ T 0
but not the true states, and they can have contingent consumptions based on the signal profiles
t ∈ T announced by all the agents. Decisions are made at the ex ante level. The common
consumption set is the positive orthant Rm+ . In the sequel, we shall state several assumptions
on the economy.
A1. The utility function of each agent depends on her consumption x ∈ Rm+ and the true
state s ∈ S but not on the private signals of the agents in the economy. Thus, we can let u
be a function from I × Rm+ × S to R+ such that for any given i ∈ I, u(i, x, s) is the utility of
agent i at consumption bundle x ∈ Rm+ and true state s ∈ S. For any given x ∈ Rm+ , u(i, x, s) is
I ⊗S-measurable in (i, s) ∈ I×S. Let c, d ∈ R+ be two constants. For any given (i, s) ∈ I×S,
u(i, x, s), (also denoted by u(i,s)(x)), is continuous and monotonic in x ∈ Rm+ , and dominated
by c‖x‖+ d for any x ∈ Rm+ , where ‖ · ‖ is the Euclidean norm.16
A2. For any given (i, s) ∈ I × S, u(i, x, s), (also denoted by u(i,s)(x)) is concave in
x ∈ Rm+ .
A2′. For any given (i, s) ∈ I × S, u(i, x, s) is strictly concave in x ∈ Rm+ .
14For q ∈ T 0, τi({q}) is the probability P (t˜i = q).
15For simplicity, here we only work with the private signal process f instead of the more general idiosyncratic
signal process as defined in Definition 4 of [15]. There is no problem to use exactly the same proof to generalize
our result in Theorem 4 to the more general setting.
16The utility function u(i, ·, s) is monotonic if for any x, y ∈ Rm+ with x ≤ y and x 6= y, u(i, x, s) < u(i, y, s).
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A3. Let e be a λ-integrable function from I to Rm+ with e(i) as the initial endowment of
agent i.17
We shall now consider an economy where the agents are informed with their signals but
not the true state. Formally, the collection Ep = {(I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P ), u, e, f, s˜} is called a
Private Information Economy.
The space of consumption plans for the economy Ep is the space L1(P T ,Rm+ ) of integrable
functions from (T,T , P T ) to Rm+ , which is infinite dimensional. Fix an agent i ∈ I. For a
consumption plan z ∈ L1(P T ,Rm+ ), let
Upi (z) =
∫
Ω
u(i, z(t), s)dP (3)
be the ex ante expected utility of agent i for the consumption plan z.18
Definition 6. (1) An allocation for the economy Ep is an integrable function xp from (I ×
T,I ⊠ T , λ⊠ P T ) to Rm+ ; agent i’s consumption plan is xp(i, ·) (also denoted by xpi ).
(2) An allocation xp is feasible if for P T -almost all t ∈ T , ∫
I
xp(i, t)dλ(i) =
∫
I
e(i)dλ(i).
(3) A feasible allocation xp is said to be ex ante efficient if there does not exist a feasible
allocation yp such that for λ-almost all i ∈ I, Upi (ypi ) > Upi (xpi ).
(4) Two allocations xp and yp are said to be utility equivalent if Upi (x
p
i ) = U
p
i (y
p
i ) for λ-almost
all i ∈ I.
(5) Two allocations xp and yp are said to be essentially equivalent if for λ-almost all i ∈ I,
xpi (t) = y
p(t) for P T -almost all t ∈ T .
(6) For an allocation xp, an agent i ∈ I, private signals ti, t′i ∈ T 0, let
Ui(x
p
i , t
′
i|ti) =
∫
S×T−i
ui(x
p
i (t−i, t
′
i), s)dP
S×T−i(·|ti) (4)
be the interim expected utility of agent i when she receives private signal ti but mis-reports
as t′i. The allocation x
p is said to be incentive compatible if λ-almost all i ∈ I,
Ui(x
p
i , ti|ti) ≥ Ui(xpi , t′i|ti)
holds for all the non-redundant signals ti, t
′
i ∈ T 0 of agent i (i.e., τi({ti}) > 0 and
τi({t′i}) > 0).
17Since the true state s ∈ S is not known to the agents, the agents’ endowments cannot depend on s. However,
as in [9] and [15], here we also assume that the endowments do not depend on the private signals of agents.
18By assumption A1, there are constants c, d ∈ R+ such that for any given (i, s) ∈ I × S, u(i, x, s) ≤ c‖x‖+ d
for any x ∈ Rm+ , which guarantees that
∫
Ω
u(i, z(t), s)dP is finite for each agent i ∈ I .
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(7) A feasible allocation xp is said to be an ex ante Walrasian allocation (ex ante competitive
equilibrium allocation) if there is a bounded measurable price function p from (T,T ) to
R
m
+ \ {0} such that for λ-almost all i ∈ I, xp(i) is a maximal element in the budget set{
z ∈ L1(P T ,Rm+ ) :
∫
T
p(t) · z(t)dP T ≤
∫
T
p(t) · e(i)dP T =
(∫
T
p(t)dP T
)
· e(i)
}
under the expected utility function Upi (·).
(8) A coalition A (i.e., a set in I with λ(A) > 0) is said to ex ante block an allocation xp in
Ep if there exists an allocation yp such that ∫
A
yp(i, t)dλ(i) =
∫
A
e(i)dλ(i) for P T -almost
all t ∈ T , and for λ-almost all i ∈ A, Upi (yp(i)) > Upi (xp(i)).19 A feasible allocation xp is
said to be in the ex ante core of Ep, or simply an ex ante core allocation in Ep, if there is
no coalition that ex ante blocks xp.
We are now ready to state two results on the general consistency between ex ante efficiency
and incentive compatibility.
Theorem 4. (1) Under assumptions A1, A2, A3, for any ex ante efficient allocation xp, there
is an incentive compatible, ex ante efficient allocation yp that is utility equivalent to xp.
(2) Under assumptions A1, A2′, A3, for any ex ante efficient allocation xp, there is an
incentive compatible, ex ante efficient allocation yp that is essentially equivalent to xp.
It is obvious that any ex ante core allocation is ex ante efficient. It is also easy to check
that any ex ante Walrasian allocation is ex ante efficient. Hence the following two corollaries
are clear consequences of Theorem 4.
Corollary 1. (1) Under assumptions A1, A2, A3, for any ex ante core allocation xp, there
is an incentive compatible, ex ante core allocation yp that is utility equivalent to xp.
(2) Under assumptions A1, A2′, A3, for any ex ante core allocation xp, there is an
incentive compatible, ex ante core allocation yp that is essentially equivalent to xp.
Corollary 2. (1) Under assumptions A1, A2, A3, for any ex ante Walrasian allocation xp,
there is an incentive compatible, ex ante Walrasian allocation yp that is utility equivalent to xp.
(2) Under assumptions A1, A2′, A3, for any ex ante Walrasian allocation xp, there is
an incentive compatible, ex ante Walrasian allocation yp that is essentially equivalent to xp.
19One can also only define the allocation yp on A× T instead of I × T . However, there is no loss of generality
since one can always extend a function defined on A× T to I × T to keep its integrability.
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4 Appendix
4.1 Proofs of the results in Subsection 2.3
In Corollary 1, we work with E(f |I ⊗ C) to state a version of the conditional exact law of large
numbers. The following lemma shows that E(f |I ⊗ C) provides the conditional expectations of
individual random variables in a measurable way.
Lemma 3. Let f be a real-valued integrable process on (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P ), C a countably
generated sub-σ-algebra of F , and g = E(f |I ⊗ C). Then, for λ-almost all i ∈ I, the conditional
expectation E(fi|C) = gi.
Proof: Fix any C ∈ C. By the definition of conditional expectation, the identity∫ ∫
A×C
f dλ⊠ P =
∫ ∫
A×C
gdλ⊠ P
holds for any A ∈ I. Hence, the Fubini property implies that∫
A
[∫
C
(fi(ω)− gi(ω))dP
]
dλ = 0.
Thus, for any C ∈ C, we have ∫
C
(fi(ω)− gi(ω))dP = 0 for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
Take a countable sub-collection {Cn}∞n=1 of C such that it generates C and is closed under
finite intersections. The previous paragraph shows that for each n ≥ 1, ∫
Cn
(fi − gi)dP = 0
holds for all i ∈ In with λ(In) = 1. Let I0 =
⋂∞
n=1In. Then λ(I0) = 1, and for each i ∈
I0,
∫
Cn
(fi − gi)dP = 0 for each n ≥ 1. Since the Cn’s form a pi-system, the well-known pi − λ
theorem20 implies that for each i ∈ I0,
∫
C
(fi − gi)dP = 0 for all C ∈ C.
By the classical Fubini theorem, there is A0 ⊆ I with λ(A0) = 1 such that gi is C-
measurable for each i ∈ A0. Let A1 = I0 ∩ A0. Then λ(A1) = 1, and for each i ∈ A1, gi is
C-measurable, and ∫
C
fi dP =
∫
C
gi dP for all C ∈ C. Hence, for each i ∈ A1, E(fi|C) = gi.
Proof of Lemma 1: By the Fubini property, we know that for λ-almost all i ∈ I, µi is C-
measurable. Let {On}n≥1 be a countable base of open sets in X which is closed under finite
intersections. Then, by Corollary 2 on [3, p.227], we have for each n ≥ 1,
E(1On(f)|I ⊗ C)(i, ω) =
∫
X
1On(x)dµ(i, ω)(x) = µ(i, ω)(On).
By Lemma 3, there exists a set I0 ∈ I with λ(I0) = 1 such that for any i ∈ I0, µi is C-
measurable, and P
(
f−1i (On)|C
)
= E(1On(fi)|C) = µi(ω)(On) for all n ≥ 1. This implies that
for any i ∈ I0, µi is a regular conditional distribution of the random variable fi given C.
20See, for example, Theorem 3.2 in p42 of [2].
13
Proof of Theorem 1: Let µ be a regular conditional distribution of f given I ⊗ C. Let
{On}n≥1 be a countable base of open sets in X which is closed under finite intersections. Then,
for each n ≥ 1, we have
E(1On(f)|I ⊗ C)(i, ω) =
∫
X
1On(x)dµ(i, ω)(x) = µ(i, ω)(On). (5)
By the conditional independence assumption, we know that for each n ≥ 1, for λ-almost all
i1 ∈ I,
P (f−1i1 (On) ∩ f−1i2 (On)|C) = P (f−1i1 (On)|C) · P (f−1i2 (On)|C)
holds for λ-almost all i2 ∈ I. Thus, for any given n ≥ 1, the random variables in the process
1On(f) are essentially uncorrelated conditioned on C. It then follows from Corollary 1 and
Equation (5) that for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω,
λ(f−1ω (On)) =
∫
I
1On(fω(i))dλ(i) =
∫
I
µ(i, ω)(On)dλ(i)
holds for all n ≥ 1. Therefore, λf−1ω =
∫
I
µω(i)dλ for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω. That is, f has no
individual uncertainty in aggregation given C.
4.2 Proofs of the results in Subsection 2.4
For a given real-valued integrable process f on a Fubini extension (I ×Ω,I ⊠F , λ⊠P ), and a
countably generated σ-algebra C of events, one can take the conditional expectations of f given
I ⊗ C and I ⊗ F respectively. The following lemma characterizes when the two conditional
expectations are equal.
Lemma 4. Let f be a real-valued integrable process on (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P ), C a countably
generated sub-σ-algebra of F , g = E(f |I ⊗ C) and h∗ = E(f |I ⊗ F). Then the following are
equivalent.
(1) For any fixed A ∈ I, ∫
A
fω(i)dλ =
∫
A
E(f |I ⊗ C)dλ for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω.
(2) h∗ = g.
(3) h∗i is C-measurable for λ-almost all i ∈ I.
Proof: First consider (2) =⇒ (1). Assume (2), i.e., h∗ = h, and fix any A ∈ I. Then, for any
F ∈ F , we have∫ ∫
A×F
f dλ⊠ P =
∫ ∫
A×F
E(f |I ⊗ F)dλ⊠ P =
∫ ∫
A×F
g dλ⊠ P.
Hence by Fubuni property, for any F ∈ F ,∫
F
∫
A
fωdλ dP =
∫
F
∫
A
gω dλ dP,
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which implies that for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, ∫
A
fωdλ =
∫
A
gωdλ.
Next, assume that (1) holds, i.e., for any fixed A ∈ I, ∫
A
fωdλ =
∫
A
gωdλ holds for
P -almost all ω ∈ Ω. For any F ∈ F , ∫
F
∫
A
fωdλ dP =
∫
F
∫
A
hωdλ dP. Thus,
∫∫
A×F
E(f |I ⊗
F)dλ⊠ P = ∫∫
A×F
g dλ⊗ P . By the pi − λ theorem, h∗ = g, i.e., (2) holds.
(2) =⇒ (3) follows from the classical Fubini theorem.
It remains to show (3) =⇒ (2). Assume (3). It is clear that E(h∗|I ⊗ C) = g. By Lemma
3, we have for λ-almost all i ∈ I, E(h∗i |C) = hi. Since h∗i is C-measurable for λ-almost all i ∈ I,
we have h∗i = gi for λ-almost all i ∈ I. Applying the Fubini property again, we have for any
A ∈ I and F ∈ F ,∫ ∫
A×F
h∗dλ⊗ P =
∫
A
∫
F
h∗i dPdλ =
∫
A
∫
F
gidPdλ =
∫ ∫
A×F
gdλ⊗ P,
which implies (2) by the pi − λ theorem.
Proof of Proposition 2: Assume that for any fixed A ∈ I, ∫
A
fω(i)dλ =
∫
A
E(f |I ⊗C)dλ for
P -almost all ω ∈ Ω. Let g = E(f |I ⊗ C) and h∗ = E(f |I ⊗ F). Lemma 4 implies that g = h∗.
Since E(f − h∗|I ⊗ F) = 0, we have E(f − g|I ⊗ F) = 0.
Let α be any real-valued square integrable random variable on (Ω,F , P ). We have E((f−
g)α|I ⊗F) = 0. Taking the conditional expectation further on I ⊗C, we obtain E((f − g)α|I ⊗
C) = 0. It follows from Lemma 3 that E((fi − gi)α|C) = 0 for λ-almost all i ∈ I. Hence, by
applying Lemma 3 again, we obtain that α and fi are conditionally uncorrelated given C for
λ-almost all i ∈ I. To show f is essentially conditionally uncorrelated given C, we just need to
fix α = fi′ for λ-almost all i
′ ∈ I.
Lemma 5. Let f and f ′ be any real-valued square integrable processes on (I×Ω,I⊠F , λ⊠P ),
and C a countably generated sub-σ-algebra of F . Suppose E(f |I ⊗ F) = 0. Then we have for
λ-almost all i1 ∈ I, E(f ′i1fi2 |C) = 0 for λ-almost all i2 ∈ I.
Proof: For λ-almost all i1 ∈ I, f ′i1 is square integrable on (Ω,F , P ); fix such an i1 ∈ I. By
taking α = f ′i1 and g = 0 as in the proof of Proposition 2, we obtain that E(f
′
i1
fi2 |C) = 0 for
λ-almost all i2 ∈ I.
Proof of Theorem 2: Let µ be a regular conditional distribution of f given I⊗C and {On}n≥1
be a countable base of open sets in X which is closed under finite intersections. Fix n ≥ 1, for
any A ∈ I, the assumption of no coalitional individual uncertainty in aggregation implies that
for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, λ((fAω )−1(On)) =
∫
A
µiω(On)dλ, and thus it follows from Lemma 1 that∫
A
1f−1ω (On)
(i)dλ =
∫
A
E(1f−1ω (On)(i)|I ⊗ C)dλ. (6)
15
Let fn(i, ω) = 1f−1(On)(i, ω) and g
n = E(1f−1(On)|I ⊗ C)). By Equation (6) and Lemma 4, we
have E(fn|I ⊗ F) = gn, which means E(fn − gn|I ⊗ F) = 0. For any given m ≥ 1, Lemma 5
implies that for λ-almost all i1 ∈ I, E
(
1
f−1
i1
(Om)
ω) · [fni2 − gni2 ]|C
)
= 0 for λ-almost all i2 ∈ I.
This means that for λ-almost all i1 ∈ I,
P (f−1i1 (Om) ∩ f−1i2 (On)|C) = P (f−1i1 (Om)|C)P (f−1i2 (On)|C)
holds for λ-almost all i2 ∈ I. By grouping countably many null sets together as in the proof of
Theorem 2.8 of [14], we can obtain that for λ-almost all i1 ∈ I,
P (f−1i1 (Om) ∩ f−1i2 (On)|C) = P (f−1i1 (Om)|C)P (f−1i2 (On)|C)
holds λ-almost all i2 ∈ I, and for all m,n ≥ 1. By Theorem 1 of [3, p.230], fi1 and fi2 are
essentially pairwise conditionally independent given C.
4.3 Proofs of the results in Subsections 2.5 and 2.6
To prove Theorem 3, we shall first work with a real-valued square integrable process f on
(I ×Ω,I ⊠F , λ⊠P ), and consider an analog of Theorem 3 in the setting of coalitional sample
means. Let Cf0 be the σ-algebra generated by the F-measurable mappings {
∫
A
fω(i)dλ : A ∈ I}
together with the P -null sets. The following proposition presents some properties about Cf0 .
Proposition 4. Let f be a real-valued square integrable process on (I ×Ω,I⊠F , λ⊠P ). Then
we have following properties.
(1) The σ-algebra Cf0 is countably generated.
(2) For any A ∈ I, ∫
A
fω(i)dλ =
∫
A
E(f |I ⊗ Cf0 )dλ for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω.
(3) The process f is essentially conditionally uncorrelated given Cf0 .
Proof: By Lemma 2, there exists a countably generated σ-algebra C such that f is essen-
tially pairwise conditionally independent given C. Hence, f is also essentially conditionally
uncorrelated given C. Without loss of generality, we work with the strong completion of such
a countably generated σ-algebra. Fix any A ∈ I. Then Corollary 1 implies that ∫
A
fωdλ is
C-measurable. By the arbitrary choices of A, we obtain that Cf0 ⊆ C. This means that (1) holds.
Fix any A ∈ I. The Fubini property implies that for any C ∈ Cf0 ,∫
C
∫
A
fωdλdP =
∫ ∫
A×C
fdλ⊠ P =
∫ ∫
A×C
E(f |I ⊗ Cf0 )dλ⊠ P =
∫
C
∫
A
E(f |I ⊗ Cf0 )dλdP.
Since both
∫
A
fωdλ and
∫
A
E(f |I ⊗ Cf0 )dλ are Cf0 -measurable, the above equation implies that∫
A
fωdλ =
∫
A
E(f |I ⊗ Cf0 )dλ, which means that (ii) holds.
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(iii) follows from Proposition 2.
Proof of Theorem 3: Let f be a process from (I × Ω,I ⊠ F , λ ⊠ P ) to a Polish space X.
As above Lemma 2 implies the existence of a countably generated σ-algebra C such that for
λ-almost all i1 ∈ I, fi1 and fi2 are conditionally independent given C for λ-almost all i2 ∈ I.
Without loss of generality, we work with the strong completion of such a countably generated
σ-algebra. Fix any A ∈ I. Then Theorem 1 implies that for any B ∈ B, λ
((
fAω
)−1
(B)
)
is
C-measurable. By the arbitrary choices of A and B, we obtain that Cf ⊆ C. This means that
(1) holds.
Let µ be a regular conditional distribution of f given I ⊗ Cf . Fix any A ∈ I. For any
B ∈ B, λ
(
(fω)
−1 (B)
)
is Cf -measurable. By the same idea as in the proof of Proposition 4 (2),
we can obtain that λ
(
(fω)
−1 (B)
)
=
∫
A
µiω(B)dλ. Thus (2) holds.
(3) follows from Theorem 2 and parts (1) and (2) of this theorem.
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose that f is essentially pairwise exchangeable. Proposition
7 of [7] shows the existence of a F-measurable mapping µ from Ω to M(X) such that f is
essential i.i.d. conditioned on the countably generated σ-algebra C generated by µ, and µ is a
regular conditional distribution of fi given C for λ-almost i ∈ I.
Let µ′ be a regular conditional distribution of f given I ⊗C. By Lemma 1, µ′i is a regular
conditional distribution of fi given C for λ-almost i ∈ I. Hence, for λ-almost i ∈ I, µ′i = µ.
Theorem 1 implies that or P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, λf−1ω =
∫
I
µ′iωdλ =
∫
I
µωdλ = µω. Therefore, C
is generated by the sample distribution λf−1ω .
4.4 Proofs of the results in Section 3
Proof of Theorem 4: (1) Let xp be any ex ante efficient allocation. For any ω ∈ Ω, denote
the realized signal distribution λf−1ω by γ(ω); thus γ is a F measurable mapping from Ω to
∆0. Note that the definition of the signal process f does not depend on s ∈ S, and hence
λf−1ω can also be viewed as a T -measurable function from T to ∆0. By Theorem 1, we have
γ(ω) = λf−1ω = µ¯(ω) for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω. The non-triviality assumption implies that the
sub-σ-algebra of F generated by γ and the P -null sets is the same as C, which implies that there
is a Borel measurable function β from ∆0 to S such that for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω, s˜(ω) = β(γ(ω)).
For any i ∈ I and ω = (s, t) ∈ Ω, let x¯p(i, ω) = xp(i, t). We shall use ρ to denote the
regular conditional distribution λ ⊠ P
(
(x¯p)−1|I ⊗ C) of x¯p given I ⊗ C. Then there exists a
I × S-measurable function ν from I × S to M(R+M ) such that ρ(i, ω) = ν(i, s˜(ω)) for λ ⊗ P -
almost all (i, ω) ∈ I ×Ω. Let α be the I ×S-measurable mapping from I ×S to Rm+ defined by
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α(i, s) =
∫
R
m
+
x dν(i, s). Thus, we have for λ⊗ P -almost all (i, ω) ∈ I × Ω,
E(x¯p|I ⊗ C) =
∫
R
m
+
x dρ(i, ω) =
∫
R
+
M
x dν(i, s˜(ω)) = α(i, s˜(ω)) = α(i, β(γ(ω))).
Since γ can be viewed as a T -measurable function from T to ∆0, α(i, β(γ(t))) defines a
I ⊗T -measurable function from I×T to Rm+ . For each (i, t) ∈ I×T , let yp(i, t) = α(i, β(γ(t))).
It is clear that yp is I ⊗ T -measurable and hence I ⊠ T -measurable. For λ ⊗ P -almost all
(i, ω) ∈ I × Ω, y¯p(i, ω) = yp(i, (t˜(ω))) = α(i, β(γ(ω))) = E(x¯p|I ⊗ C). By Lemma 3, we obtain
that for λ-almost all i ∈ I, y¯pi (ω) = E (x¯pi |C) = αi(β(γ(ω))) for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω . For any
C ∈ C, the Fubini property implies that∫
C
∫
I
yp(i, t˜(ω))dλdP =
∫
I×C
yp(i, t˜(ω))dλ⊗ P =
∫
I×C
E (x¯p|I ⊗ C) dλ⊗ P
=
∫
I×C
x¯pdλ⊗ P =
∫
C
∫
I
x¯pdλdP =
∫
C
∫
I
e(i)dλdP. (7)
By the arbitrary choice of C ∈ C, we obtain that ∫
I
yp(i, t˜(ω))dλ =
∫
I
e(i)dλ for P -almost all
ω ∈ Ω. Hence ∫
I
yp(i, t)dλ =
∫
I
e(i)dλ for P T -almost all t ∈ T , which means that yp is a feasible
allocation in Ep.
Next we show that the allocation yp is incentive compatible. Since no single agent could
change the realized signal distribution, it is obvious that for any i ∈ I, γ(t−i, ti) = γ(t−i, t′i) for
all t−i ∈ T−i and all ti, t′i ∈ T 0. Hence, for λ-almost all i ∈ I, for any signal ti with positive
probability, we obtain that
Ui(y
p
i , t
′
i|ti) =
∫
S×T−i
ui(y
p
i (t−i, t
′
i), s)dP
S×T−i(·|ti)
=
∫
S×T−i
ui(αi(β(γ(t−i, t
′
i))), s)dP
S×T−i(·|ti)
=
∫
S×T−i
ui(αi(β(γ(t−i, ti))), s)dP
S×T−i(·|ti)
= Ui(y
p
i , ti|ti).
Therefore, the allocation yp is incentive compatible.
For i ∈ I, ω = (s, t) ∈ Ω, let v(i, ω) = u(i, xpi (t), s). Then, we have
E(v|I × C) =
∫
R
m
+
u(i, x, s˜(ω))dρ(i, ω).
It follows from Lemma 3 that for λ-almost all i ∈ I, E(vi|C) = E(v|I × C). Since u(i, ·, s) is
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concave, Jensen’s inequality (see Lemma 3.5 in [8, p.49]) implies that for λ-almost all i ∈ I
Ui(x
p
i ) =
∫
Ω
v(i, ω)dP =
∫
Ω
E(vi|C)dP =
∫
Ω
E (v(i, ω)|I ⊗ C) dP
=
∫
Ω
∫
R
m
+
u(i, x, s˜(ω))dρ(i, ω)dP
≤
∫
Ω
u(i,
∫
R
m
+
x dρ(i, ω), s˜(ω))dP
=
∫
Ω
u (i,E(x¯p|I ⊗ C), s˜(ω)) dP
=
∫
Ω
ui(y¯
p
i , s˜(ω))dP = Ui(y
p
i ). (8)
Let di = Ui(y
p
i )− Ui(xpi ) for each i ∈ I, and A = {i ∈ I : di > 0}. If λ(A) > 0, then∫
A
∫
T
u(i, ypi (t), β(γ(t)))dP
T dλ =
∫
A
Ui(y
p
i )dλ >
∫
A
Ui(x
p
i )dλ
=
∫
A
∫
T
u(i, xpi (t), β(γ(t)))dP
T dλ ≥
∫
A
∫
T
u(i, 0, β(γ(t)))dP T dλ. (9)
Then, there exists δ1 > 0 and a I ⊠ T measurable set D0 ⊆ A× T such that λ⊠ P T (D0) > δ1
and for any (i, t) ∈ D0, yp(i, t) 6= 0 on D0. Thus there exists δ > 0, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and D ⊆ D0
such that λ ⊠ P T (D) > δ and the k-th component of yp(i, t) > δ for any (i, t) ∈ D. Let ek
be the vector in Rm+ which is one at the k-th component and zero otherwise. Without loss of
generality, we can assume λ(Dt) < 1 for any t ∈ T . For w ∈ [0, δ], let
y˜p(i, t, w) =
{
yp(i, t) − wek if (i, t) ∈ D
yp(i, t) if (i, t) /∈ D,
and Φ(i) = {w : w ∈ [0, δ] and Ui(y˜p(i,w)) ∈ [Ui(y
p
i ) − 14di, Ui(ypi )]}. It is clear that for any
fixed i ∈ I, Ui(y˜p(i,w)) is continuous and decreasing in w ∈ [0, δ], and for any fixed w ∈ [0, δ],
Ui(y˜
p
(i,w)
) is I-measurable i ∈ I. Then, Φ is a compact valued measurable correspondence. For
i ∈ A, if w is positive and small enough, the continuity Ui(y˜p(i,w)) implies that w ∈ Φ(i). Let
φ(i) = maxw∈Φ(i)w. Then φ(i) > 0 for any i ∈ A. Define an allocation
zp(i, t) =


yp(i, t)− φ(i)ek if (i, t) ∈ D
yp(i, t) +
∫
Dt
φ(i)dλ
1−λ(Dt)
ek if (i, t) /∈ D.
It is clear that the allocation zp is feasible.
Fix any i ∈ A. It is easy to see for any t ∈ T , zp(i, t) ≥ y˜(i, t, φ(i)) and Ui(y˜(i, φ(i))) ≥
Ui(y
p
i )− 14di > Ui(ypi )− di = Ui(xpi ); then Ui(zpi ) > Ui(xpi ).
Next, consider i /∈ A. Then (i, t) /∈ D for any t ∈ T , and thus zpi (t) = xpi (t)+
∫
Dt
φ(i)dλ
1−λ(Dt)
ek.
Let DT = {t : λ(Dt) > 0}; then λ(DT ) > 0. For any t ∈ DT , Dt is a subset of A with λ(Dt) > 0,
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which implies that
∫
Dt
φ(i)dλ > 0; hence, zpi (t) > x
p
i (t). For any t /∈ DT , we have λ(Dt) = 0,
which means that zpi (t) = y
p
i (t). The monotonicity assumption on the utility function ui implies
that Ui(z
p
i ) > Ui(y
p
i ). Therefore, Ui(z
p
i ) > Ui(x
p
i ) for λ-almost all i ∈ I, which contradicts the
ex ante efficiency of xp. Thus, λ(A) = 0. By (8), xp and yp are utility equivalent.
(2) The result in part (1) says that Ui(y
p
i ) = Ui(x
p
i ) for λ-almost all i ∈ I. The the
inequality in (8) becomes an equality for λ-almost all i ∈ I. Assumption 2′ requires ui to be
strictly concave in the consumption variable x ∈ Rm+ . Thus, a strict version of Jensens inequality
implies that for λ⊠P -almost all (i, ω) ∈ I ×Ω, ρ(i, ω) is the Dirac measure δ∫
Rm
+
x dρ(i,ω) at the
point
∫
Rm
+
x dρ(i, ω).
For any j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and x ∈ Rm+ , let ψj(x) = √xj . Then, we have
E (ψj(x
p
i )|C)) =
∫
R
m
+
ψj(x) dδ∫
Rm
+
x dρ(i,ω) = ψj
(∫
R
m
+
x dρ(i, ω)
)
= ψj(E(x
p
i |C)). (10)
For simplicity, let hj be the function such that hj(ω) = ψj(x¯
p
i (ω)) for any ω ∈ Ω. Then equation
(10) implies that E (hj|C)) =
√
E
(
h2j |C)
)
. That is, E
(
h2j |C
)
= [E (hj |C)]2, which means that
E
(
(hj − E (hj|C))2 |C
)
= 0. Hence, E
(
(hj − E (hj |C))2
)
= 0, which implies that hj = E (hj |C).
It means that the j-th component of xpi (·) is C-measurable for any j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Therefore,
we can claim that for λ-almost all i ∈ I, xpi = E (xpi |C) = ypi , and we are done.
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